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Abstract: This paper presents a diagnostic approach to the role and capacity of governments to 
facilitate local collective action and alleviate environmental problems. The paper adds to a 
nascent scholarship aiming to conciliate theories on “governance by government” and 
“governance by self-organization”. We adopt two premises for that purpose: (1) policy 
instruments shall be tailored to the strategic nature of local resource management decisions; 
and (2) such nature is not static and can be modified via governmental policies. We first build 
on the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework to characterize the decision-
making situations that local resource users face and the local rules that shape said situations. 
Then, based on common pool resource (CPR) and policy instrument choice theory, we identify 
four mechanisms through which different policy instruments can facilitate local collective 
action (change in payoffs and their perception, reduction of transaction costs, reduction of 
uncertainty, and normative consonance). This analytical approach is then applied to four 
illustrative cases of water management in Germany, France, Greece and Spain. As shown, local 
resource users are embedded in not one but many overlapping decision-making situations. In 
this context, the promotion of collective action is rarely accomplished via a single policy 
instrument or mechanism but via bundles of them. Also, the paper illustrates the importance of 
understanding how governmental policies modify the structure of rules and incentives that 
affect local resource users, potentially facilitating local collective action and the solution of 
environmental problems. 
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In the last decades, the scope of governance alternatives for natural resource management has 
increased substantially. Traditionally, private property and state management were considered 
as the two only governance options likely to foster the sustainable management of common-
pool resources (Hardin 1968). Over the 80s and 90s, growing evidence showed that users of 
natural resources could also self-organize for the management of resources. Those experiences 
constituted the base of a (new) common pool resource (CPR) theory (Ostrom 1990, Poteete et 
al. 2010) and a general recognition of the benefits of local collective action. Numerous 
decentralized policies, co-management arrangements, participatory decision making 
experiences and community-based conservation mechanisms have built since then on such 
understanding (Berkes 2004, Ansell and Gash 2008).  
Local collective action, however, should not be seen as an environmental governance panacea, 
nor as an alternative to market institutions or the government. Despite the current momentum 
of local collective management experiences, public administrations including national, 
regional, local governments and sometimes supranational regulations still have a great deal of 
influence over the management of natural resources. For once, governments often back up 
property regimes with formal monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms based on the state’s 
administrative capacities and coercive powers (Ostrom and Cox 2010). More importantly, 
governments may also play an important role in the facilitation and promotion of collective 
action experiences (Lemos and Agrawal 2006, Mansbridge 2014). A good example in point is 
the practice and study of Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES). Although originally 
conceived as a pure market instrument where buyers and sellers transact ecosystem services 
(Engel et al. 2008), PES have more recently been highlighted for their dependence on 
government and community-based organizations (and NGOs), as well as their potential to 
strengthen local cooperation  (Muradian 2013, Sikor et al. 2017). 
While a number of policy studies have theorized about the different instruments governments 
can use to solve environmental problems (Howlett 2004, Jordan et al. 2005, Goulder and Parry 
2008), there is still rudimentary understanding about how policy instruments relate to local 
collective action situations and cooperation outcomes. The objective of this paper is to start 
filling that gap by exploring the extent to which different structures of incentives underlying an 
action situation warrant the use of different instruments.  
We propose an analytical approach composed of two building blocks. Following Bowles (2009) 
and the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (Ostrom et al. 1994), we pay 
attention to the different decision making situations (i.e, action situations) that local resource 
users experience and the rules that frame them. Additionally, we build on policy instrument 
choice theory to feature policy interventions according to the types of instruments used and 
mechanisms through which these interventions shall promote local collective action (Anthony 
and Campbell 2011). Ultimately, the goal is to test alignments between local action situations, 
policy instruments, and the collective behaviour of resource users, and by these means also 
explore how those instruments translate into specific rules. 
Previous literature has formalized the interaction between policy instruments and specific 
action situations. For example, Bouma and Ansink (2013) analyse whether and how targeted 
payments for ecosystem services can extend the number of highly cooperative individuals in a 
larger community. Similarly, Zavalloni et al. (2016) analyse the combined use of incentives and 
minimum participation rules to enhance collective action. These studies model a specific policy 
intervention in a specific situation and generate detailed results on the interaction between the 
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policy and the situation. Here, we trade depth for breadth and test our analytical approach 
against a selection of collective action experiences from the field of water management in the 
European Union.  
Water management is one of the sectors where the governmental push for local collective action 
solutions has been most evident (Sabatier et al. 2005). In Europe, the Water Framework 
Directive and its emphasis on basin level management and participatory decision making 
processes is paradigmatic (Boeuf and Fritsch 2016). Other notable examples include a variety 
of local water pollution control experiences (Davies et al. 2004), and water conflict resolution 
mechanisms (Zikos and Hagedorn 2017). The empirical cases in this study were selected with 
the aim to capture diversity in management issues and settings in different countries. They 
include a German case of drainage management, a French case of water pollution control, a 
Spanish case of water conflict resolution, and a Greek case of participatory planning and 
management.  
Section 2 presents the analytical approach linking types of action situations and policy 
interventions (i.e., instruments) based on contributions from CPR literature and policy 
instrument choice theory. This section also includes two conjectures about the relationship 
between situations and instruments. Section 3 describes the case study method used to apply 
the analytical approach and test the conjectures. Section 4 presents the results of applying the 
approach to the four cases of local collective action for water management. Section 5 
synthesizes and compares the findings vis a vis the conjectures and the role of rules and 
analytical and methodological challenges.  
2. Analytical approach 
In this study we understand that local resource users are inclined to act jointly (in their own 
interest as a group and/or in the public interest) when they ultimately expect to improve their 
individual welfare that way (Scharpf 1997, Ostrom 1999a). Collective action from this 
perspective refers to the willingness and ability of resource users to coordinate their behavior 
in different degrees to realize both individual and group benefits (Ostrom 1990). 
According to North (1988), the state, administered and steered by the government, trades a 
group of services, captured through concepts such as protection and justice and that way 
improves peoples’ welfare in return for tax revenue. In modern, democratic societies, 
governments allegedly aim to conform to the desires of their principals, call it citizens, electoral 
constituencies, interest groups or even international conventions, in order to maintain order and 
legitimacy. Such motivation, which we equate in this paper to the public interest at large, may 
require the promotion of collective action at the local level.   
According to the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (IAD), local resource 
users interact in “action situations”, which are situations where decisions by a group of 
individuals create outcomes that accrue to them or other groups (McGinnis 2011a). There are 
three sets of variables that shape action situations: resource characteristics, attributes of the 
community of resource users, and rules (Figure 1). In the water context (e.g., a river, an aquifer, 
an irrigation system), relevant resource characteristics believed to affect cooperation include 
the existence of infrastructure, the size of the system, or the predictability and  productivity of 
the resource (Meinzen Dick 2007). Important attributes of the community comprise the size and 
heterogeneity of the user group and the existence of sufficient levels of trust among the users, 
to mention a few (Agrawal 2001). Rules are prescriptions about what individuals are allowed 
or obliged to do and potential sanctions in case of infraction. Different types of rules shape 
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action situations (Ostrom 1999b, pp. 508): “Boundary rules affect the characteristics of 
participants. Position rules differentially affect the capabilities and responsibilities of those in 
positions. Choice rules affect the actions that participants in positions may, must or must not 
do. Scope rules affect the outcomes that are allowed, mandated or forbidden. Aggregation rules 
affect how individual actions are transformed into final outcomes. Information rules affect the 
kind of information present or absent in a situation. Payoff rules affect assigned costs and 
benefits to actions and outcomes” (see also Appendix 1.a and 1.b).  
 
Figure 1. The IAD framework  
   
Source: Ostrom (2011)  
 
Rules crafted by resource users are embedded in the legal and regulatory framework of local, 
regional and central government (Ostrom 2011). In this context, policy interventions (i.e., via 
policy instruments) can affect the rules shaping an action situation, with the intention to modify 
interactions and outcomes. Action situations will then move from “default” situations (i.e., the 
situation before the government intervention, where there are no rules or only basic rules for 
collective action), to institutionalized (or re-institutionalized) situations (Ostrom et al. 1994). 
From this perspective, government interventions are understood as interacting with local rules, 
community attributes  and biophysical conditions in their impact on individual behavior 
(McGinnis 2011a).  To assess these relationships, we propose an analytical approach that 
distinguishes between kinds of action situations on the one hand, and policy instruments on the 
other.  
2.1. Local users: types of action situations  
We argue that three types of action situations warrant government intervention to promote 
















Figure 2. Types of action situations upon which governments shall intervene 
 
 
The first two types include settings uncovered in much of the common pool resource (CPR) 
theory where collective action entails an increase in the welfare of the group of local resource 
users and its fulfilment requires overcome collective action dilemmas (Aligica 2005, Poteete et 
al. 2010). Collective action dilemmas emerge when there is a conflict between individual and 
group benefits and are associated to the capacity of individuals to make strategic decisions (i.e., 
based on what others decide and the joint outcomes of those decisions). “If each individual 
selects strategies based on a calculus that maximizes short-term material benefits to self, 
individuals will take actions that generate lower joint outcomes than could have been achieved. 
… such situations are called dilemmas [because]…. At least one outcome yields higher returns 
for all participants, but rational participants making independent choices are not predicted to 
achieve this outcome.” (Ostrom 2007, pp. 186). The existence of a social optimum that yields 
higher returns for all participants (i.e., local users) constitutes the essence of the collective 
action dilemma. Thus, any policy shaping these situations shall be assessed with regard to 
whether there is a pareto efficiency improvement in the payoffs (i.e., increase in benefits) of all 
the local users affected by the policy1.  
CPR scholars have mostly focused on two situations that involve collective action dilemmas: 
coordination and prisoner’s dilemma (Bowles 2009). In coordination situations, collective 
action is hindered by the lack of information or common understanding about the benefits of 
collective action and the expected behaviour of resource users. Users have an individual 
incentive to coordinate on strategies that entail higher outcomes; however, the transaction costs 
                                                 
1 In this study, however, we are not testing government intervention vis-à-vis improvements in social optima but 
with regard to whether local users engage in collective action (see methods section). In the frame of mind of New 
Institutional Economics and game theory, local users would not engage in collective action if they did not expect 
their welfare to increase by that means. By the same token, government intervention is justified in the expectance 
of social welfare improvements.  
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of obtaining information about others’ strategies and building common understanding are 
considerable. Experimental evidence on coordination situations with standard populations 
shows that the capacity to communicate and share information, understandings or norms 
alleviates the coordination problem (Balliet 2010). Thus, one way to overcome the dilemma 
may therefore be that the government lowers transaction costs of communication, share 
information and ultimately coordination. A typical example is that of irrigation systems that are 
composed of many irrigation associations and/or distributed over large command areas. Even 
when the associations share an interest in joint management of water and infrastructure, the 
costs of collective decisions, for example, can be particularly high. Not without reason large, 
state-promoted irrigation systems have adopted a federal organizational structure whereby 
farmers in local systems elect leaders that represent them in decisions at larger scales (Meinzen-
Dick 2007). Also, it may be necessary that a sufficient number of users coordinate (Kimmich 
2013). Again, reaching such a threshold of participants may be facilitated if the government 
subsidizes coordination costs of a certain number of actors. Finally, an important characteristic 
of coordination situations is that punctual interventions can have long-lasting effects (Bowles 
2009). This is because once an intervention induces agents to choose superior equilibrium 
strategies, no user benefits from deviating from the coordination equilibrium (Schelling 1980 
calls this a focal point).  
In prisoners’ dilemma situations it is not the lack of information alone but rather a particular 
structure of incentives that leads to sub-optimal outcomes. Given a set of payoffs (i.e., costs 
and benefits), users have a dominant strategy to not cooperate and free-ride on the cooperation 
of others. In natural resource management contexts, such situation is represented by the 
classical “Tragedy of the Commons” (Hardin 1968), which illustrates the perverse incentives 
leading to resource degradation. A paradigmatic example in the water sector is that of 
groundwater in many regions around the world (Lopez-Gunn and Cortina 2006). The 
difficulties of monitoring water use constitute an important disincentive for farmers to restrain 
use, usually in contexts where water is already scarce. The transboundary nature of aquifers 
only aggravates the situation. That is the case of the divided island of Cyprus where two players 
(groups of Cypriot farmers from the North and South), with insufficient formalised 
communication channels and absence of any cross-border institutions or island-wide policies 
to regulate the use water, are competing for the resource in a sort of “race to depletion” and in 
the fear that their efforts to conserve ground water resources are jeopardized by the other party 
(Zikos and Roggero 2013, Zikos et al. 2015). 
As shown by CPR scholars, cooperation in prisoner’s dilemma situations can increase when 
communication is feasible. Communication allows agents to play reciprocal strategies or reach 
and abide by joint agreements or norms (Balliet 2010).  By the same token, governments shall 
trigger or facilitate those efforts by changing the structure of payoffs, or the way users perceive 
them for example through framing particular choices (Anthony and Campbell 2011). Contrary 
to the coordination situation, however, the mere provision of information and communication 
in a prisoner’s dilemma may not be enough to maintain cooperation, at least in the long term 
(Ostrom and Walker 1991, Lopez and Villamayor-Tomas 2017). Similarly, the effects of other 
policy interventions shall last only while the intervention is in place, unless resource users 
develop or comply with self-organizing rules and norms enforced for example through social 
pressure (Bowles 2009).  
The third type of action situations includes settings where local users are not confronted with a 
collective action dilemma but with a conflict situation in the form of a zero-sum game. In zero-
sum game situations the wins of one side accrue at the expense of the losses of the other. These 
situations are not collective action dilemmas because there is not a “cooperative scenario” 
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where the welfare increases for all users. Users may be acting in a coordinated fashion (e.g., as 
steered by the government) but they do not face the dilemma of acting in benefit of the group 
or not. Many of the conflicts around dam-building planning all over the world can be understood 
as zero-sum situations where the wins of downstream users associated to water storage and 
predictability are to a great extent mirrored by costs borne by the upstream communities whose 
lands are flooded (Villamayor-Tomas et al. 2016, Moran et al. 2018). Also, many local zero-
sum situations do not involve just local users but also the broader public (i.e., “outside users” 
at large). In these action situations, which we want to call externality situations, local resource 
users do not directly benefit from acting collectively even if the public at large does. 
Externalities do not significantly harm/benefit local resource users but “outsiders” of the local 
decision-making arena. Thus, there is, by default, no incentive for local users to change their 
behavior. This includes many of the environmental (positive and negative) externality situations 
uncovered in the environmental policy and economics scholarship (Stavins 2007), and typically 
portrayed in mobile pollution problems such as water pollution or acid rain(Walls and Palmer 
2001).  
There is a long tradition studying ways to cope with externality situations. The Coase theorem, 
stresses that these situations can be dealt with via deliberation processes among agents (when 
there are few numbers of agents) and side payments. In practical applications, however, Coase 
bargaining will rarely work satisfactorily because the preconditions are not met (no or low 
transaction costs, fully defined property rights, etc.). Thus, alternative types of solutions, i.e., 
government policies, are often called for (Bromley 1991). When groups of external 
beneficiaries can be identified, the government may try to facilitate transactions between 
beneficiaries and local resource users minimizing transaction costs that way. An example of 
this are Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) programs in the water sector (de Lima et al. 
2017). In cases where external beneficiaries are difficult to identify, governments may fund 
payments to local users on the basis of general tax revenues, impose rights via sanctions, or 
create right transfer systems (see cap-and-trade programs) (OECD 2013). Similar to the 
prisoner’s dilemma situation, local resource users shall modify their behaviour if payoffs or 
perceptions of payoffs change, and the modified behaviour may endure only while the new 
payoffs or perceptions last (Grafton 2000).  
2.2. Government intervention: types of policy instruments  
The second piece of our analytical approach (i.e., in addition to the distinction of different action 
situations) is the featuring of government interventions. Based on policy instrument choice and 
CPR theory, we characterize government interventions based on the instruments used (see table 
1). 
One of the main contributions of policy instrument theory is the distinction of types of 
instruments. The literature in this regard is vast and ranges from the traditional classification of 
command-and-control instruments (pollution caps, licenses, resource use quotas)  vs. economic 
instruments (taxes, subsidies, fees…) (Bemelmans-Videc et al. 2011),  to more sophisticated 
typologies involving multiple dimensions and levels of analysis (Richards 2000, Lascoumes 
and Le Galès 2007, Howlett 2009). In a seminal contribution to the field, Christopher Hood 
(1986) argued that governments have essentially four means to affect citizen’s behavior. In 
addition to their capacity to coerce (i.e., to command & control) and to mobilize the “treasure” 
(i.e., via economic instruments like subsidies or taxes), governments can also use information 
(i.e.,  government reporting, advice, education programs) and organization (i.e., new 
organizations, enabling procedures, capacity building programs) (Howlett 2009). 
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Hood’s typology has notably influenced the policy instrument literature within CPR 
scholarship, which focuses on the tools that government can use to promote local collective 
action (Grafton 2000, Lubell et al. 2002, Koontz et al. 2004, Anthony and Campbell 2011, 
Mansbridge 2014). Despite its potential, the literature has progressed only partially. This may 
have to do with the traditional focus of CPR scholars on top-down, centralized natural resource 
management systems and their deficits  (Acheson 2006, Cox 2016) and their relative ignorance 
of other means through which governments can have an impact  on local resource management. 
Centralized systems do fail, but this does not mean that the capacity of governments to 
command-and-control is always ineffective or that governments cannot use other policy 
instruments. In a variety of situations, local polluting firms have recognized the presence of the 
state’s “whip in the window” (i.e., in the form of standards or taxes) and chosen voluntarily to 
avoid it by organizing themselves into associations to self-regulate (Maxwell et al. 2000, 
Villamayor-Tomas et al. 2014). Additionally, governments can be supportive and facilitate 
cooperative behaviour via economic, organizational and information instruments (Grafton 
2000), and also framing instruments (Anthony and Campbell 2011).  Resource user groups may 
just lack the economic means to cover organizational set-up costs or collective resource use 
infrastructure that the government can provide (Koontz et al. 2004, Anthony and Campbell 
2011). The promotion of river basin or groundwater organizations and collective irrigation 
infrastructure by the government in many countries around the world are paradigmatic 
examples here (Lopez-Gunn and Cortina 2006, Garces-Restrepo et al. 2007, Boeuf and Fritsch 
2016). Also, sometimes resource users do not collaborate for lack of information, perspective 
and understanding of the benefits of it. The government here can not only provide the necessary 
information in a relatively neutral way via water monitoring systems (Mansbridge 2014) but 
also appropriate interpretation of the information to steer behaviour in a particular direction 
(i.e., framing), like in  water efficiency and collaborative planning campaigns (Mckenzie 2000, 
Lubell 2003, Pavitt 2011). 
2.3 Mechanisms linking policy instruments and collective action across situations 
One way to link policy instruments and local collective action is looking at causal mechanisms 
behind collective action. Mechanisms can be broadly understood as “the processes and 
intervening variables through which causal or explanatory variables produce causal effects” 
(Bennett and George 1997, cited in Mahoney 2001). Much of CPR theory why some local user 
groups are able to engage in local collective action can be synthesized in a few mechanisms, 
including: a reduction of uncertainty (i.e. about the cooperative behaviour of others), a reduction 
of transaction costs (e.g. of collective decision making and monitoring), changes in pay-offs 
(i.e., the costs and benefits of acting collectively) and normative consonance (i.e., around 
payoffs shared goals) (Ostrom 1992, 2010, Cárdenas and Ostrom 2004, Poteete et al. 2010).  
Preliminary evidence from the environmental policy field hints at some associations between 
types of policy instruments and collective action mechanisms (see Table 1).  Governments can 
reduce uncertainty and transaction costs of local collective action via public information and 
monitoring instruments, or the organization of platforms for communication and collaborative 
planning among resource users (Kallis et al. 2006, Newig and Fritsch 2009, OECD 2013). For 
example, in a study of 76 government-sponsored watershed management partnerships in 
California and Washington, Leach and Sabatier (2003) found that that trust was important to 






Table 1. Expected associations between policy instruments and action situations  





Organization (e.g., introduction of participatory 










(e.g., public information protocols, EIAs…) 
Framing  
(e.g., discourses, awareness raising campaigns) 
 
Normative consonance 












(e.g., environmental regulations, standards, 
ITQs…) 
Economic 
(e.g., environmental taxes/subsidies, PES…) 
1 Based on Richards (2000), Lemos & Agrawal (2006), Howlet (2009), Hood (1986); Howlett (2009) Anthony & 
Campbell (2011) and Mansbridge (2014). Anthony and Campbell (2011) mention information to argue about the 
role the state has in changing perceptions about payoffs.  
2 Based on Ostrom (2006), Poteete et al. (2010) 
 
Changes in payoffs can be accomplished via economic and command-and-control instruments, 
including for example the enforcement of environmental taxes, quality standards, quotas and 
conservation areas, or the implementation of infrastructure subsidies and payments for 
ecosystem services (Richards 2000, Lemos and Agrawal 2006, Jordan et al. 2010).  In a study 
of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s WasteWise program, for example, Delmas & 
Keller (2005) found that organizations joining the program were more likely to cooperate and 
report waste generation when there were benefits associated to such reporting. 
Finally, normative consonance and changes in perceptions about payoffs can be promoted via 
appropriate framing instruments such as awareness raising campaigns, corporate social 
responsibility programs, and collective deliberation processes (Lubell 2003, Lund‐Thomsen 
and Nadvi 2010).  In a study of watershed management, for example, Lubell (2003) found that 
the collective-action beliefs (i.e., beliefs about net benefits of cooperation) of stakeholders 
involved in a participatory estuary management program were stronger than those of 
stakeholders in estuaries not involved in the program. 
 
All the above paves the way to formulate some conjectures about associations between types 
of policy instruments and types of action situations. Specifically:  
- We expect that problems profiling coordination situations tend to be resolved via policy 
instruments that reduce transaction costs and uncertainty (i.e., information and 
organizational instruments).  
- We expect that collective action in prisoner´s dilemma, and zero-sum/externality 
situations will tend to require instruments that change pay-offs and understandings (i.e., 
economic, command-and-control and framing instruments) in the long run.  
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Last but not least, policy instruments do not operate in an institutional vacuum locally. They 
have an impact on behavior because they modify, create or contribute to implement rules that 
frame action situations (Ostrom et al. 1994). How they do so has largely been unaddressed in 
the literature. The IAD distinction of different types of rules facilitates a first exploration. In 
what follows we test the analytical approach and conjectures and explore associations with rules 
against a series of “most-different” cases of water management. 
 
3. Methods  
Cases were selected based on three common features, including the existence of an 
environmental problem, a local group of water users believed to contribute to the problem and 
its potential solution, and a policy intervention aiming at fostering collective action by users for 
solving the problem. The case studies differ in terms of the type of environmental problem and 
purpose of the government intervention, as well as the spatial scale and collective action 
outcomes. Collective action is measured through different proxies in the cases, including the 
ability of local users to self-organize and operate local collective management organizations 
(i.e., in the German and French cases, respectively), and the ability to collectively come to terms 
for conflict resolution, and planning (i.e., in the Greek and Spanish cases). Cases were 
documented by the authors on the basis of previous fieldwork and/or secondary sources such 
as technical papers, published case studies, Ph.D. theses or government reports to which the 
authors had access to (see Appendix 2 for details for each case). Special attention in the data 
collection was paid to the stylized characterization of the default local setting, the public interest 
pursued by government intervention, and the policy instruments through which such 
intervention materialized.  
The analysis proceeded in two steps. First, we developed analytical narratives of the cases 
(Bates et al. 1998). This involved the identification of the group of local resource users and 
their interests, the motivation for the government to promote a change in the behaviour of users, 
and whether this was accomplished. Then, we reviewed the case through the proposed 
approach. This involved a characterization of the default action situation/s (i.e., before the 
intervention), an inventory of the policy instruments used by the government to promote 
change, the rules affected (see Appendix 1.b for details on the question used to assess the rules), 
and a reasoning about the mechanisms through which said instruments paved the way for 
collective action among the users. When possible, we traced the process of events that linked 
the government intervention and the change in behaviour by resource users (Collier 2011).   
 
4. Results 
In what follows we present the narratives of the four cases (see Table 2 for a summary). 
Appendix 3 contains also a detailed characterization of the situation before government 
intervention (i.e., “default”) and the situation after as per the IAD components (resource and 
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1See Appendix 3 for details about the changes in rules before and after the government intervention. 
Note: within each case, some policy instruments (see organization instruments in particular) have been 
disaggregated into different rows to highlight the separate effect of different components. 
4.1. Drainage maintenance, Germany 
The first case covers the successful intervention by the regional government in Schraden (the 
level of the Land), Brandenburg, Germany, in the period 1994 – 2005 to counterbalance the 
water quality, soil and ecosystem degradation produced by drainage management and the lack 
of maintenance of collective drainage infrastructure (Schleyer 2012). 
This case is characterized by the existence of three overlapping situations among users (i.e., 
farmers, nature protection agencies, anglers, municipalities and other land and forest owners). 
First, for all users, the maintenance of drainage infrastructures represents a prisoners’ dilemma 
as drainage is a local public good the provision of which faces incentives to free-ride. Second, 
operation of the drainage system faces both coordination and zero-sum situations. On the one 
hand, farmers are confronted with a coordination situation. They have similar interests 
regarding water tables, thus operation of the drainage system mostly requires that they 
coordinate on how to maintain the desired water table. On the other hand, farmers and other 
water users (i.e., municipalities, other landowners) have different interests regarding the level 
at which to maintain water tables. Farmers prefer maximal drainage to facilitate production, 
while some landowners and municipalities prefer higher water tables to maintain certain aquatic 
habitats. Here, users are embedded in a zero-sum situation, where satisfying the preferences of 
one type of user goes in detriment of the preferences of the other type. Accordingly, some are 
willing to financially contribute to drainage while others are not (Schleyer 2012).  
The intervention of the government included several instruments. First, the government 
promoted the set-up of a “Kleine-Pulsnitz water association” with the mission of managing 
drainage (scope rules). This expectedly reduced transaction costs among farmers to come 
together; indirectly it affected or rather established information rules as the newly established 
forum facilitated information exchange. More importantly, an infrastructure maintenance 
subsidy program (payoff rule) was introduced and the municipalities became obligatory 
members that were charged on behalf of farmers. Subsequently, municipalities used their 
statutory rights to levy fees from farmers (new position and information rules). This changed 
the structure of payoffs making payments more likely. Also, mandatory membership fees 
charged to farmers (payoff rule) provided means for the association to invest in the maintenance 
of the drainage system. Municipalities also became responsible for monitoring the compliance 
of farmers with management plans within their jurisdictions (position and information rules), 
thus reducing the uncertainty associated to non-compliance at relatively low cost (i.e., as 
compared to direct monitoring by the central government or the set-up of a farmer-to-farmer 
monitoring). This minimized free riding behaviour by farmers. Joint planning was further 
facilitated by a group of researchers that created a temporary roundtable for agri-enviromental 
affairs in the area (Agrarumweltforum), as well as by planning processes steered by the Nature 
Protection Agency and attended by the municipalities on behalf of farmers (aggregation rules). 
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This contributed to reduce the transactions costs of bargaining for local users. The purpose of 
bargaining was to find solutions that maximize benefits of local users (i.e., benefits resulting 
from mutual adjustment for drainage management). It is unclear whether the communication 
process itself contributed to said adjustment (i.e., beyond reducing the transaction costs of it). 
Agri-environmental subsidies (pay-off rules rewarding the alignment of farmer’s interests and 
management choice to those of municipalities) seem to have played a stronger role in that 
regard. In result, the status of maintenance of the drainage system was improved but, as the 
study also shows, further deficiencies remained. Responsible for continuing problems that the 
study diagnosed were sometimes stark differences in interests among farmers, mainly because 
of differences in farm size. Very large farmers were able to adapt by themselves sidelining the 
role of drainage management. Further, for a long period, collective action at the local level was 
weakened by the fact that it was not embedded into higher scale coordination through land and 
water use planning (Schleyer, 2012).  
4.2. Pollution control, France 
The second case corresponds to a problem of agricultural water pollution in France and the 
implementation of the Ferti-Mieux program (1991-2002 country-wide, and to date in Rhin-
Meuse water basin), i.e., a governmental program with the goal to coordinate and label local 
collective actions of farmers for a better management of nitrogen use at a water-catchment level 
(Papy and Torre 2002).  
This case can be understood as an externality situation. Like in similar upstream-downstream 
pollution contexts, polluters (here farmers) have little incentive for reducing the level of 
pollution or contributing to the maintenance of water quality downstream (Villamayor-Tomas 
et al. 2014). Changes in farming practices may be costly and farmers do not generally draw 
direct economic benefits from reducing water pollution as these mostly materialize 
downstream.  
The creation of a labelling system by the government provided marketing benefits for farmers 
in exchange of reducing the use of fertilizer (i.e., payoff rule). The participation of farmers was 
also triggered by the threat of regulatory intervention if the objectives of pollution control were 
not met (payoff rule). This constituted an incentive for farmers to join the system. The 
government intervention put farmers in a prisoner’s dilemma situation, where the efforts of 
some could be jeopardized by the free-riding behaviour of others. To avoid this, a monitoring 
system was established based on direct controls of farms by a local technical committee 
(information rule). By creating a basic local organizational structure with a mission (scope 
rules), pre-designed roles (i.e., position rules: steering committee, coordinator…), membership 
(boundary rules) and procedures to co-design the Nitrogen Management Plans (aggregation 
rules), the government also lowered transaction costs associated to coordination among farmers. 
Finally, information costs regarding changes in agricultural practices were reduced via a 
technical assistance program (information rule) for farmers.  
Between 1991 and 2001, 65 operations were labeled, involving about 35,000 farmers and 
representing 4.6% of the agricultural area (Verron, 2007). The effects of the "Ferti-Mieux" 
operations on water pollution were mixed, with no evidence of decrease in nitrate rates in 
groundwater bodies; however, one explanation could be the inertia of hydrologic processes in 
groundwater systems. In areas where surface waters were targeted, more than a half of the 
operations led to a decrease or a stabilization of nitrate rates (Papy and Torre, 2002).  
Governmental support was crucial in this case, as illustrated by the fact that most operations 
collapsed after the official stop of the policy at the national level, except for the operations in 
14 
 
the Rhin-Meuse water basin area, where the Water Agency decided to take over the support of 
the Ferti-Mieux program at the water basin level. Indeed, the on-going “Ferti-Mieux” 
operations in the area were evaluated as successful, in terms of farmers’ involvement and water 
quality improvement (Bernard 2004).   
4.3. Participatory decision-making Greece 
The third case covers the implementation by the local government and a European research 
project of an informal forum for information exchange and deliberation in the metropolitan area 
of Volos, within the Pinios basin, Greece (2004-2006). The forum, which addressed previously 
failed attempts at participatory watershed planning and conflicts between water users (farmers, 
urban users) in the basin, paved the way for further planning efforts (Dimadama and Zikos 
2010).In this case several action situations overlapped. First, water users were confronted with 
a coordination situation, i.e. one where transaction costs prevented the identification of win-
win planning measures. However, the coordination situation was superseded by two 
circumstances. First, contradicting interests of stakeholders (protection of water resources vs. 
increased supply, allocation of water for different uses and tariff policies to mention a few) had 
escalated into conflicts, ending up at the courtroom. Thus, water users found themselves in a 
zero-sum situation where satisfying the interests of one player resulted in direct losses for the 
other. Third, stakeholders were trapped in a situations that echoes a prisoner´s dilemma. In the 
absence of communication and because of actors’ fears of being the only party giving in to the 
other’s interests, the stakeholders pursued their own utility maximisation related to water 
planning and water projects despite the potential gains from cooperation (Zikos and Thiel 
2013).   
The financing and organization of a series of deliberative meetings within the framework of a 
research project set the basis for low cost communication among stakeholders. The scope of the 
experience was similar to that of the failed participatory water planning process; however, local 
users played a different role, i.e., one of equals as part of a relatively open research process 
(new position and choice rule). Furthermore, expected opportunity costs of non-participation 
increased due to the commitment by both the local government and the water utility to endorse 
the forum outcomes. In this sense, scope for joint decisions, was considerably larger than under 
the old participatory process (new scope rule). Also, the prospect of influencing directly 
regional water policies and indirectly national policies through the implementation of a River 
Basin Pilot project in the region, provided incentives for actors to maintain meaningful 
discussion and exchange beyond the period of existence of the forum itself. Moreover, the 
provision of collective and choice rules that deliberation turned from a finite set of fora meetings 
into an infinite sequence of negotiations facilitated the disciplining effect of potential for tit-
for-tat strategies through these consecutive, ongoing negotiations. This new constellation 
facilitated the resolution of conflicts outside courts. Perceptions of stakeholders were changed 
in a way that made it too “costly” for any actor involved to drop out from participating in the 
meetings. Although the network ceased to exit after the researchers pulled-out from their 
facilitating role, the established cooperative structures and collective decision-making culture 
survived. This resulted in the continuous, amicable resolution of conflicts between actors 
persisting until today but it also facilitated water related policy decisions that had been 





4.4. Dam building conflict resolution, Spain 
The fourth case revolves around the conflict that emerged between upstream communities and 
downstream irrigators over a dam-building project in the Matarraña watershed in Aragon, Spain 
(1997-2005). To solve the conflict and avoid future conflicts over dam-building, the regional 
government created a multi-stakeholder platform under its tutelage, i.e., the “Water 
Commission”.  
The conflict had put in evidence a zero-sum situation, where environmental benefits and costs 
(i.e., of a big infrastructure project) were distributed in a way that caused clear winners and 
losers, and where compensation to local communities was not an option for the communities. 
The conflict had created a stalemate  that did not benefit the general public nor the local users 
(Casajús Murillo et al. 2012).  
The Water Commission organization was created with a mission (scope rule) and a basic set of 
rules about who would participate and in which role and decision capacity (boundary, position 
and choice rules). All this lowered the transaction costs of getting the stakeholders together. 
This was key in the process, as nor the parties or the central government via its Water Agency, 
had shown any ability to facilitate such process. The group of users participating in the 
Commission had ample discretion to explore alternatives to the original dam building project 
(scope rule); the central government would accept whatever decision would come out of the 
process. This added credibility to the process and increased the opportunity costs of not 
participating in it (Celaya 2006). Farmers initially benefited from considerable lobbying power 
over the central government (the initial project had been designed to satisfy their interests); 
however, an unfavourable Environmental Impact Assessment of the project confirmed that the 
kind of big public works that the project represented were not a possibility (new scope rule), 
and balanced farmers’ power in favour of the upstream communities, which facilitated 
bargaining (Monge and Presa 2011). Also, the Commission was created with a basic set of rules 
to deliberate and make decisions (aggregation rules). This not facilitated the collective 
bargaining (Monge and Presa 2011) and ultimately also the generation of sufficient common 
understanding and trust among the parties so each was willing to give up to some of their claims 
(Casajús Murillo et al. 2012). In 2005 the stakeholders in the Water Commission reached a 
collective agreement to replace the original project with a project consisting of the construction 
of a series of smaller reservoirs in different locations of the basin and contiguous basins. Two 
of the pools have been constructed and in operation (Casajús Murillo et al. 2012).  
5. Discussion  
The analysis of the cases yields a number of discussion points. Some of them speak about 
insights gained through the analytical approach, the validity of our conjectures and policy 
implications. A number of other insights uncover challenges and ways to move forward. 
 
 
5.1. A diversity of action situations and policy instruments; a one to one 
relationship? 
Overall, the cases display different degrees of complexity, as measured by the types of action 
situations that local user groups face, and the number and diversity of policy instruments used 
by the governments to steer their behaviour. 
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As per our knowledge of the cases, the German drainage case displays the highest degree of 
complexity. Users are embedded in three overlapping situations that require collective action. 
One of them is related to the maintenance of shared infrastructure (prisoner’s dilemma) and the 
two others are associated with the coordinated management of the infrastructure (a coordination 
or zero-sum situation depending on the configuration of local actors). Contrasting with the 
German drainage case is the Spanish dam building conflict case, which is featured by a single 
zero-sum situation. Although the German and Spanish and Greek cases all feature a zero-sum 
situation, the German and Greek cases involves also other action situations which makes them 
less comparable to the Spanish case. In the German case, the zero-sum situation is only 
indirectly related to the management problem, i.e. solving conflicts about drainage operations 
is secondary to first self-organizing to invest in infrastructure maintenance and the drainage 
management protocol. The Greek case is similar to the German case in that the solution of the 
zero-sum situation first requires overcoming the prisoner’s dilemma that prevents users to get 
together in the first place. Alternatively, in the Spanish case, the zero-sum situation is core to 
the problem at stake.  
Everything being equal, the existence of interacting action situations makes problems more 
difficult to diagnose and policy less predictable than otherwise as one has to take into account 
how policy interventions, in one situation affect adjacent situations (McGinnis 2011b). In a 
study of water-energy use interactions in India and Spain, for example, Kimmich and 
Villamayor-Tomas (2017) show how policy interventions aiming to make irrigation 
associations less vulnerable to droughts and more prone to irrigation development resulted in 
issues of energy use sustainability, respectively. By the same token, in the German case, policies 
focusing only on resolving the coordination situation among farmers (i.e., via drainage plans 
that ignore the interests of municipalities and other users) could have aggravated the zero-sum 
problem situation that confronts farmers and the other users. The French case is also revealing 
in this regard. Initially, farmers did not face any collective action dilemma (externality 
situation); however, they were confronted with a prisoner’s dilemma once the government 
pushed for abating nitrogen pollution. A government intervention aiming only at making 
farmers reduce nitrogen use without recognizing the prisoner’s dilemma the farmers face to do 
so would have undergone serious effectiveness issues.  
Also, in none of the cases the emergence of collective action can be explained by a single policy 
instrument. Indeed, all cases display bundles of instruments, ranging from the combination of 
mostly organizational instruments (communication forum and collective choice rules) in the 
Greek case, to the combination of organizational, economic and command-and-control 
instruments (decision making fora, collective choice rules, funding for monitoring and 
infrastructure, enforcement, and subsidies) in the German case. This illustrates the interest of 
assessing environmental policy instruments from a configurational perspective rather than 
understanding them as alternatives (Bemelmans-Videc et al. 2011).    
We did not find evidence of the use of framing instruments in any of the cases. We believe this 
has to do with data limitations rather than with the actual lack of relevance of this type of 
instruments. Framing has been shown to be a powerful governance instrument in the hands of 
governments (Schneider and Ingram 1993, Hajer and Laws 2010). To some extent, framing is 
ubiquitous in governmental action. The mere definition of problems, attribution of causes and 
proposal of solutions is an exercise of framing (Gusfield 1981). For example, in the French 
case, the Ferti-Mieux program enhanced the understanding of nitrogen pollution as a problem 
caused by local farmers. Thus, the intervention was steered to encourage farmers to do 
something about it. Also, recognizing the constructed nature of environmental problems and 
associated action situations is important (Lubell 2003, Anderies et al. 2011). The Greek case is 
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illustrative here; although in essence users were confronted with a zero-sum situation associated 
to the water planning controversy, they also perceived the situation as involving a prisoner’s 
dilemma whereby the fear of being the only part giving in prevented them from engaging in 
more constructive approaches to decision-making.  
A more detailed look at action situations and instruments sheds some light on the validity of 
our conjectures. In almost all instances we observe an alignment between the use of economic 
and/or command-and-control instruments on the one hand and the existence of a prisoner’s 
dilemma and/or a zero-sum/externality situation. This provides support our second conjecture 
about the relationship between said types of action situations and policy instruments. 
Importantly, the cases indicate that economic and command-and-control instruments alone are 
not sufficient to promote local collective action. In all cases, including also those uniquely 
profiled by a zero-sum/externality situation (French and Spanish cases), those instruments were 
complemented with organizational or informational instruments. In other words, organizational 
and informational instruments were not exclusively associated to coordination situations, which 
goes against our first conjecture. The pervasiveness of these types of instruments is not totally 
counterintuitive as they contribute to reduce transaction costs and uncertainty about the 
effectiveness of collective action. This points to the outstanding relevance of transaction costs 
in collective action theory (Williamson 1981, McGinnis 2005), and the importance to balance 
the costs and benefits of collective action (Ostrom 1990).  
Finally, the findings also prove the existence of a many-to-one relationship between policy 
instruments and action situations. As illustrated particularly in the French and Spanish cases 
but also in the other cases, action situations are addressed by several instruments 
simultaneously. This is not trivial given that much of the policy tool literature has assumed a 
one to one relationship between instruments and problem situations, and rather ignored the 
potential or even need to use multiple instruments to promote a particular collective behaviour 
(Howlett, 2004). 
5.2. The provision of rules for collective action  
The analysis also sheds light on how government intervention affects local collective action 
rules. In all the cases, the government intervention meant the creation of rules that structure 
self-organization by users (boundary, position, choice, aggregation and scope rules). This was 
mostly accomplished via organization and command-and-control instruments. In some cases, 
the rules filled an institutional gap. In the German case, the sponsoring of the Kleine-Pulsnitz 
water association by the government involved the creation of new rules that were previously 
inexistent, including new boundary rules (i.e., membership in the association), scope rules 
(water association as new local authority over drainage management outcomes and access and 
representation in negotiations over funds made available by higher level public authorities), and 
a redefinition of positions and choice options (see in particular the new role of municipalities). 
Similarly, in the French case, the Ferti-Mieux program provided for an institutional framework 
facilitating self-regulation by farmers vis à vis nitrogen control in a context marked by the initial 
disinterest of farmers to do something about pollution (i.e., externality situation). Alternatively, 
in the Greek and Spanish cases, the sponsorship of a local communication forum by the local 
government, overlaid existing institutions (see in particular position, choice and information 
rules), which were indeed at the origin of the stalemate.    
Also, the impact of government on rules that structure self-organization takes place at different 
levels of action (Kiser and Ostrom 1982). First, the setting-up of new organizations like the 
Kleine-Pulsnitz water association or the Ferti-Mieux scheme is a “constitutional” act by which 
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the government enables a space for collective decision and action by local users. The new 
boundary, position and choice rules for local users facilitated that farmers “come together” to 
address the problem. Second, by providing means for users to bargain and make decisions 
within those organizations (i.e., aggregation rules), the government was facilitating that farmers 
self-organize also at the collective choice level (i.e., to make collective decisions about how to 
manage the resource).  
Although rules that structure self-organization are important, they do not seem to be sufficient. 
Stakeholders still needed to buy into and abide by the new rules. In this regard, the changes in 
the pay offs made by the government (mostly via command-and-control) also played a major 
role. In the German case, the obligation to enrol the association and pay membership fees and 
the implementation of pro-conservation subsidies paved the way for water users (particularly 
farmers) to buy into the new collaborative regime. The same can be argued about the threat of 
discretionary action by the government in both the Spanish and the French cases, and the 
incentive triggered by the governmental endorsement of local decisions in the Greek and 
Spanish cases. 
A more fine-grained look at the relationship between rules and mechanisms reveals some 
unexpected alignments. Not all changes in the pay-offs (i.e., net benefits) of cooperation were 
the result of changes in pay-off rules (rules rewarding or sanctioning cooperative/ 
individualistic behavior). In the Spanish, and Greek cases, scope rules (i.e., endorsing local 
users’ leverage to make collective decisions involved an important change in payoffs for users 
(i.e., an increase in the opportunity costs of not participating in the collective decisions and/or 
of not coming to agreements, respectively). Also, in the Spanish case, a change in a scope rule 
(i.e., the release of the Environmental Impact Assessment which restricted the original project 
and potentially also similar options) meant an important change in the costs of failing to reach 
an agreement for farmers. Finally, in the German case a boundary rule (i.e., obligatory 
membership of municipalities and farmers in the drainage association) meant an important 
change in the situation since the measure directly curtailed free riding behaviour (i.e., vis a vis 
participating in the organization of drainage). All these examples illustrate the interest of 
carrying further work on types of rules and their effects on collective action mechanisms 
(Poteete et al. 2010).   
5.3.  “Governance by government” vs. “governance by self-organization”? 
The above results also question the traditional cleavage between theories of “governance by 
government” (such as policy instrument choice theory) and “governance by self-organization” 
(such as the theory of the commons). Lemos and Agrawal (2006) long pointed to the existence 
of a false trichotomy between governance by government, governance through markets and 
governance via self-organization and point to the existence of numerous hybrid arrangements 
such as government-led payment for ecosystem services, co-management and participatory 
decision-making programs, or cap-and-trade systems. Similarly, Driessen et al. (Driessen et al. 
2012) theorize about the existence of different modes of governance depending on the 
dominance exerted by the government over civil society (self-organized groups) and markets 
and associate different actor, institutional and policy features (including instruments) to each 
mode. Our contribution builds on the above works and furthers it by looking at the strategic 
interactions between local resource users (i.e., the distinction between types of action 
situations), the local rules that shape individual behaviour and local collective action, and the 
instruments that governments use to promote such collective action. 
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To be sure, our findings should not be understood as an argument in favour of delegating the 
promotion of local collective action and/or environmental governance entirely to governments. 
Although we have not included here cases of government intervention failure, the risks of such 
failure are significant, as already well-illustrated in the CPR literature (Acheson 2006). Those 
risks, on the other hand, should not prevent scholars from looking at the potential of 
governments and local communities to interact in mutually beneficial ways. The co-
management literature is unique in its focus on such interactions and the identification of the 
conditions under which “governance by government” and “governance by self-organization” 
can help each other (Koontz et al. 2004, Frey et al. 2016). As illustrated here, a complementary 
entry point is the study of the condition under which governments can promote self-
organization.   
5.4. Analytical and methodological challenges 
In carrying this study, we confronted a few challenges that deserve to be mentioned here. 
Further research shall tackle them more systematically than done here.  First, our analytical 
approach deliberately omits a public choice perspective  (Mueller 1997), according to which 
governments and their representatives are heavily influenced by organizational survival and 
electoral competition dynamics. It is unclear in the French or Spanish cases, for example, 
whether the government intervened to promote environmental protection or rather to maximize 
agricultural and rural development interests given increasing European pressure for 
environmental conservation and infrastructure cost recovery. Although this speaks about the 
“why” of governmental/bureaucratic decisions and our concern is rather about the “how” of 
those decisions, it is difficult to separate both. An extension of the approach shall integrate both 
questions concerns.  
Second, understanding the existence and nature of strategic interactions between local users is 
useful to diagnose problems and solutions; however, the strategic nature of the problem is not 
the only relevant piece of information. Historical contexts, and non-economic aspects such as 
identity and culture matter too (Van Riper et al. in press). Additionally, delimiting the group of 
local users is challenging. Local user groups were equated to farmers in most of the cases 
reviewed here. However there are potentially as many types of users as ecosystem services and 
groups that benefit from those services (Boyd and Banzhaf 2007). Indeed, a broad definition of 
“user” may make drawing the boundaries between “local” resource users and the larger public 
quite difficult.  Finally, identifying the action situations that local users face is difficult. As 
illustrated in all cases, and also pointed in related research, local resource users’ decisions are 
shaped by multiple action situations and clarifying how those situations are linked is an 
empirical question in itself (Lubell et al. 2010, Kimmich and Villamayor-Tomas 2017). 
Moreover, structures of incentives can be also constructed. As pointed out by Ostrom (1990) 
and also illustrated in the Greek case, the prisoner’s dilemma can be also “fictional” to the 
extent that actors see themselves “imprisoned” in their inability to communicate or reach 
agreements. Last but not least, and as illustrated in the French case, users may move from one 
type of action situation to another as policies are implemented, which makes inferences about 
the relationship between instruments and behaviour particularly difficult. 
Finally, a limitation of this study is the absence of counterfactuals. We are not including in this 
analysis cases of failed collective action given a government intervention. In other words, our 
analysis does not allow us to test hypotheses about whether some policy instruments are more 
appropriate than others to promote local collective action. The lack of appropriate 
counterfactuals, has indeed been pointed as a pervasive problem in collective action research 
(Agrawal 2003). Although the critique is legitimate, the identification of commonalities among 
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“positive” cases is still a valid strategy. This is particularly the case when the goal is to identify 
patterns rather than to test them (see, for example, Ostrom 1990). As illustrated here, different 
instruments (and mechanisms) can contribute to local collective action and this diversity can be 
partially explained by the action situation addressed. Further, counterfactual analysis is not the 
only path to internal validity; process tracing and within case comparisons can also contribute 
to it (Steinberg, 2007). These strategies were indeed helpful to link policy interventions and 
default situations in our cases. As illustrated by the French case, the correlation between the 
phasing out of the policy intervention and collective action among farmers supports a causal 
association between the two, which can be further understood via our analytical approach.  
6. Conclusions 
While a number of policy studies have theorized about the different instruments governments 
can use to solve public and environmental problems, there is still rudimentary understanding 
about how they relate to local collective action. We have addressed this gap by exploring 
synergies between the IAD framework, collective action theory and policy instrument choice 
theory. In the proposed approach we build on the distinction between situations that involve 
cooperation or coordination dilemmas and those that involve conflict in the form of zero-sum  
or externality situations. We have then linked the possibility of promoting local collective action 
in those situations to certain policy instruments and their impact on different types of rules. We 
expected coordination dilemmas and conflict situations to align with instruments that reduce 
transaction costs and uncertainty (i.e., information and organizational instruments); and 
cooperation dilemmas to do so with interventions that change pay-offs and understandings (i.e., 
economic, command-and-control and information instruments). We did not have strong 
expectations about alignments between instruments and rules. To test the approach and our 
conjectures and explore rule linkages we leveraged data from four water management case 
studies in Europe where government has promoted collective action among local users to tackle 
a management problem. 
As illustrated in the analysis, we found an alignment between prisoner’s dilemma and conflict 
situations on the one hand, and economic and command-and-control instruments on the other. 
This supports the second of our conjectures. Alternatively, we found that organizational and 
informational instruments were not univocally associated to coordination situations, which goes 
against our first conjecture and highlights the importance of transaction costs across the board.  
The analysis of rules is also revealing. Government intervention translated in both the creation 
of new rules as well as the modification of existing ones and affected most types of rules in all 
cases. This illustrates the complexity of understanding government impact at local levels. Also, 
rules that structure self-organization (i.e., to constitute local organizations and pave the way for 
collective decisions) revealed important but were not sufficient. Stakeholders still needed to 
buy into the new collective organization processes and abide by the decisions that emerged 
from them. Command-and-control instruments played an important role in both regards (i.e., to 
structure local self-organization and reduce uncertainty of local collective processes). Further 
research shall address more systematically the potential of command-and-control instruments 
vis a vis local collective action, also with an eye to existing literature about their deficits 
(Acheson 2006, Cox 2016). Based on our findings, we would expect that the effectiveness of 
this type of instruments increases when (1) they enforce constitutional-level rules (e.g., new 
organizational boundaries and positions that pave the way for self-organization among resource 
users); (2) when they contribute to the credibility/enforcement of rules that emerge from self-
organization processes (previously promoted by the government or not); and/or (3) when they 
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are implemented along with instruments that reduce the transaction costs and uncertainty 
associated to local collective action. 
More generally, the analysis shows that looking at strategic interactions, policy instruments and 
collective action mechanisms can shed light on the degree of complexity of environmental 
problems and solutions. In two out of our four cases, problems involved the understanding of 
multiple action situations. In none of the cases the emergence of collective action resulted from 
a single policy instrument or mechanism. The lack of a large sample limits the ability to see 
clear associations between policy instruments and the situations that local users. Still, the 
approach does allow us to provide some reasoned insights about why we see collective action 
emerging given the implementation of certain policy instruments.  
Overall, the framework draws the attention to different building blocks to better understand 
opportunities for the government to promote local collective action. The framework should 
therefore be taken as a heuristic to assess said opportunities rather than as a blueprint for policy 
recommendation. Further research shall expand the sample of cases. Also, the framework could 
be expanded by including other types of situations and that way assess other qualities of 
collective action settings, such as the time scale or the tangibility of the common good 
generated. Similarly, our compilation of collective action mechanisms may be incomplete; 
further work shall expand it within and beyond CPR and policy instrument choice theory. 
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Appendix 1.a: Types of rules that affect action situations 
 
 
Source: Ostrom et al. (1994) 
Appendix 1.b Operationalization of 7 types of rules vis collective use/management of 
local water resources  
Rule object  Definition of object Question that the rule addresses  
Scope  The range of policy issues local 
users can address as a group 
What are the ensemble of local users 
allowed, mandated or forbidden to do 
collectively vis a vis water management? 
Boundary The separation between local users 
who are part of a collective action 
venture from those who are not 
Which local users are allowed/obliged to be 
part of local collective action for water 
management? 
Position Roles enacted/assigned to local 
users who share a resource and/or 
self-organize to manage it 
Which roles are assigned to users as such 
and/or as participants in local collective 
management? 
Choice Range of use and/or management 
decisions local users can make 
based on their roles  
Which tasks/decision capacities are assigned 
to positions? 
Aggregation Collective decisions made by the 
ensemble of local resource users 
How does the ensemble of water users make 
water management decisions? 
Information Information about the conditions of 
the resource, and use 
Which information is generated, managed 
and shared among local water users? 
Pay-off Costs and benefits associated to the 
use/management of the resource 
Which benefits and costs, rewards and 
sanctions do local water users face when 







Appendix 2. Methods and sources of case studies 
Schraden, Germany: The analysis is based on a Ph.D. thesis that undertook a comparative 
case study of the Schraden, Germany and a second Polish case. In this paper we used the 
German case for illustrative purposes. The focus of the study was institutional change in 
drainage management in post-socialist contexts after the fall of the socialist German Democratic 
Republic. This obviously included a detailed description and analysis of the way a new legal 
and policy framework re-configured collective action around drainage management in the 
Schraden. Data sources of this analysis can be found in Schleyer 2012. They comprise twelve 
participatory workshops that were part of a large research project carried out in 2000, sixteen 
key informant interviews, half of which were carried out in 2000 and half of which were carried 
out in 2005, and an extensive review of documents of protocols of meetings of the drainage 
association and subject-specific newletters covering the area since the fifties. Interviews were 
transcribed and coded according to an analytical framework that captured institutional change 
in drainage management.  
France: The core study used in the analysis of Ferti-Mieux operations in France is a master 
thesis (Verron, 2007). This study relies on data collected through 22 interviews with 
coordinators of Ferti-Mieux operations in 2007. Two technical papers were used to complement 
the analysis of the case. Bernard (2004) provides a synthesis of evaluation reports realized by 
agricultural organizations, focusing more particularly on Ferti-Mieux collective initiatives in 
the Lorraine region in the Rhin-Meuse water basin. Papy and Torre (2002) provides for a 
background on the development of the Ferti-Mieux program as well as an evaluation of their 
environmental impact at the national scale.  
Greece: Background information on the Greek case is based on the articles by Dimadama and 
Zikos (2010), Zikos and Thiel 2013 and Zikos 2010 and build upon processes initated through 
the FP5 project “New Intermediary Services and the Transformation of Urban Water Supply 
and Wastewater Disposal Systems in Europe “(EVK1-CT-2002-00115). The work investigated 
how conventional hierarchies and dominant logics in Volos region in Greece, are challenged 
indirectly, in a “Trojan-horse” like way. The work, following a participatory action research 
methodology, examined the role of informal structures, and more specifically an informal social 
network set up by the researchers as a new form of governance in the framework of spatial 
development that has emerged in the shadow of an existing hierarchy.   
 
Spain: the Matarraña case is based on reports and scientific publications issued by members of 
the NGO which designed and organized the Water Commission and the conflict resolution rules 
and procedures (Celaya 2006, Monge and Presa 2011). Data was obtained also from the media 
(the conflict acquired high public visibility) and ad hoc conversations the mentioned authors 
(Ignacio Celaya and Cristina Monge). A third source of data was the doctoral thesis of Lourdes 
Casajús Murillo (2012), which studies and compares the Matarraña conflict with a similar 
conflict (the Yesa conflict) and relies on a thorough review of the media, meeting minutes of 
relevant authorities (including the Water Commission), 38 interviews with stakeholders and 
authorities, and observant participation (Casajús Murillo et al. 2012).  
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Appendix 3: Changes in rules as affected by government intervention 
Drainage management, Germany 
Rules Before government intervention (default situation) After government intervention 
Position No rules: positions defined by location within landscape Municipalities raise fees from land-owners and municipalities make landowners 
responsible for complying with drainage management rules. Statutes of the association 
assign different leadership positions within association 
Boundary No rules  Municipalities and farmers are obligatory members of the water user association.  
Choice No rules (no positions) Water users including famers and municipalities are provided with choices associated 
with particular positions negotiated in the water user association, the Agrarumweltforum 
and guidelines underpinning various streams of subsidies; municipalities are obliged to 
charge farmers (landowners) for drainage association and monitor payment 
Aggregation No rules (no collective choice) Municipalities represent farmers in deliberation and collective choice within 
Agrarumweltforum and water user association. Drainage association represents 
municipalities in higher scale negotiations on management and investment  
Information No rules: information obtained on an individual, ad hoc basis Rules of drainage management association provide for coordination of activities of 
farmers, municipalities and water managers. Rules are monitored by municipalities 
making rule compliance more predictable that way reducing uncertainty. Information 
sharing within water user association, association coordinates interventions also in 
regard to activities by public water and environmental agency. Transaction costs of 
bargaining are lowered that way. 
Payoff No rules: mismanagement of drainage creates costs for 
everyone; actors bearing or benefitting from free-rider 
behavior 
Municipalities and farmers as obligatory members that paid membership fees; 
nonpayment of fees is punished by municipalities. Membership implies benefits of 
information sharing, collective management and project funding from public authorities. 
Agro-environmental subsidies offset costs of drainage decisions that go against farmers’ 
interests. Infrastructure maintenance subsidy program 
Scope No rules: Individual drainage decisions are not constrained Establishment of “Kleine-Pulsnitz water association” with the mission to manage 
drainage through the statutes of the water user association, higher level laws and its 










Pollution abatement, France 
Rules Before government intervention (default situation) After government intervention 
Position No rules Rules defining the role of actors in different positions (committee members, 
coordinator, participating farmers)  
Boundary No rules Rules defining the membership of committees in charge of the Ferti-Mieux 
program and the eligibility of farmers to participate (to have land in a given water 
catchment)  
Choice No rules (no positions) Members of the local Ferti-Mieux operations are allowed to co-design the details 
of nitrogen management plans, which are validated by local and national 
committees involving government representatives. 
Aggregation No rules (no collective choice) Collective-choice rules for the definition of nitrogen management plans  
Information No rules: scarce information about pollution practices and impact Information sharing and reporting procedures within local operations and from the 
local to the national level of the program.  
Payoff General regulatory framework for nitrogen control (Nitrate 
Directive). Sanctions are difficult to implement due to difficulties 
to trace pollution to its sources (diffuse pollution)  
The Ferti-Mieux label is a positive reward to effective implementation of collective 
nitrogen management plan.  
Regulatory threat increases costs of polluting and/or failure to self-organize  
Scope No rules: de facto no constraints on farmer’s agricultural practices Farmers granted with authority to self-regulate nitrogen use  
 
Participatory planning, Greece 
Rules Before government intervention (default situation) After government intervention 
Position Decision making positions held by government and selection of 
stakeholders 
Stakeholders are part of the decision-making process in consulting role at regional 
and national levels 
Boundary All stakeholders affected by water works and management plans 
are outside the decision-making process   
Participation is optional; relevant stakeholders are welcome to participate. Many 
spin-off networks between actors emerge and participation in water for a is sought 
Choice Rules enabling participation of regional and local authorities and 
stakeholders in central government’s decisions not implemented.  
Ultimate decision stays in central government but influential participation of 
stakeholders at all levels of governance is established. 
Aggregation Authoritative decisions at central level, lack of transparency. Communication forum and collective choice rules: Consensus-based decisions by 
all affected stakeholders 
Information No rules: No information on any activities related to the water 
framework directive or water works and decisions. 
Institutionalized shared information practices, co-creation of new knowledge 
Payoff Benefits of those interested in water protection come at the cost of 
those interested in water supply; communication among 
stakeholders is costly (i.e., risky) for stakeholders due to strongly 
hierarchical and inefficient water governance structure.  
Increased payoffs for all as costs of information radically decreased, transaction 
costs decreased, win-win situations. 
Scope Only certain courses of action (e.g., enlargement of water supply 
infrastructure vs. nature protection) are considered legitimate. 
Culture of communication and mechanisms to resolve disagreements facilitate the 





Dam building conflict, Spain  
Rules Before government intervention (default situation) After government intervention 
Position Local communities affected by dams are outside the decision-
making process. Farmers are represented in River Basin 
Organization and enjoy lobbying power.   
Water Commission: all stakeholders hold same position in decision making 
process. Regional government and NGO facilitate self-organization process. 
Central government witnesses and ratifies (ultimate decision stays with 
Commission). 
Boundary Only central government entities have decision making authority in 
the design of dam-building policy 
Water Commission: all stakeholders are part of the decision-making process.   
Choice Farmers lobby the River Basin Organization. Farmers and local 
communities can raise concerns over dam-building project. 
Ultimate decision is to be made by officials from River Basin 
Organization and Spanish Dept. of Public Works 
Stakeholders can make alternative proposals and collegiately decide among them.  
Aggregation River Basin Organization: voting-based decisions Water Commission: Consensus-based decisions. Stakeholders are assigned votes 
depending on representativeness. 
Information Public information process follows decision about dam building 
project. 
Environmental Impact Assessment requires the collection and 
dissemination of information about the project  
Water Commission: Shared information and bargaining protocols about different 
dam-building projects. Stakeholder groups are required to elaborate memorandums 
of their interests and share them with each other. 
 
Payoff Economic compensations to communities are insufficient as 
compared to the benefits to farmers; dams are financed mostly via 
taxes.  
The risk of losing too much off via bargaining makes the high-risk, 
high-gain strategy of confrontation appealing to both communities 
and farmers.  
No additional formal rules. Informally, however: no agreement would justify 
discretionary action by central government in one or the other direction. 
Scope No environmental limitations on original dam building project, and 
no realistic alternatives 
The Water Commission has authority to decide whether the old project or any 
alternative to it are viable socially and environmentally for implementation.  
 
 
